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ABSTRACT 
From Kant’s plan for perpetual peace to Rawls’s proposal of a law of peoples, liberal projects 
for world order assume the homogeneity of states’ regimes as a determinant factor for bringing 
about peace and moral progress. Particularly, at the foundations of Rawlsian internationalism 
is the ‘fact’ of democratic peace, considered to be a sound and immutable feature of the 
international system. This article questions this oversimplified reading of Michael Doyle’s 
hypothesis about the apparent existence of a ‘separate peace’ among democratic states. It 
argues that liberal projects for global order should consider the ‘separate peace’ merely as a 
working hypothesis and they should address also the problematic aspects related to it, namely 
the unnecessary aggressiveness that democratic states show towards non-democracies and the 
coercive – and possibly illiberal – nature of the Society of Peoples.  
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The long-lasting success of Michael Doyle’s two-parted article Kant, Liberal 
Legacies and Foreign Affairs, published in 1983, is surprising: after its publication, 
it has been widely debated both among international relations and political theory 
scholars.1 However, some enthusiastic interpretations of this article present an 
oversimplified version of the original hypothesis there expressed, so that it 
appears to be a defence of democracy tout court as the best regime in a world of 
hostile regimes which force democracies to take arms in order to defend the same 
ideas of democracy and freedom. 
The main argument of the article is that Doyle’s ideas have been 
misunderstood or misrepresented, particularly by some liberal philosophers who, 
in building projects for an international order focused on the idea of the moral 
superiority of democracy and adapted Doyle’s tentative explanation transforming 
it into a general law of politics. A second argument follows from the first: the 
‘democratic peace assumption’ as a foundation of liberal projects for global order 
is not heuristically fruitful neither normatively desirable, because of the limited 
                                                          
1 DOYLE, M.W., Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs – Part 1, “Philosophy and 
Public Affairs” 12 (3), 1983, pp. 205–235; Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs – 
Part 2, “Philosophy and Public Affairs”, 12 (4), 1983, pp. 323–353. 
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explanatory force of Doyle’s hypothesis and because of the risks for peace and 
stability that a world system based on the recognized moral superiority of 
democracies could entail. 
In order to develop the arguments, the first section presents and discusses the 
main features of Doyle’s hypothesis on the phenomenon of an (apparent) absence 
of war between democratic states, the ‘separate peace’; then, the second section 
briefly highlights some Kantian elements in Doyle’s article, which were the 
starting points for a lively discussion on the nature of the link between democracy 
and war to which many political scientists took part during the 1980s and 1990s. 
At the same time, the interest for democracies and their attitude towards war 
attracted some liberal authors interested in political theory, who – basically 
misinterpreting Doyle’s essay – assumed the so-called ‘democratic peace’ to be a 
fundamental feature of the international system and adopted it as a mainstay for 
their proposals for rethinking international order.2 Hence, the third section 
presents a critical analysis of one among the most prominent philosophical 
projects for international order, as expressed in John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples.3 
Finally, the fourth section outlines the main arguments developed in the article 
and envisages two possible avenues for future investigation. 
 
 
1. Doyle’s original separate peace hypothesis  
 
Doyle’s investigation aimed at explaining how liberalism affects liberal 
democracies in their conducting foreign affairs, challenging the classic realist 
interpretation of foreign policy as a zero-sum game independent from the internal 
characteristics of the actors involved. For the sake of clarity, before presenting 
Doyle’s position in detail, it is useful to sketch the main features of the realist 
tradition of thought about international relations. 
Traditionally, realist scholars – inspired by the works of modern political 
thinkers like Machiavelli, Rousseau and Hobbes – assume anarchy to be the 
normal status of the international realm.4 Anarchy does not refer only to the 
                                                          
2 In this essay, following Doyle, I will use the label ‘separate peace’ to refer to the original 
version of the explanation of the absence of war among democracies. ‘Democratic peace’, 
an expression used by many scholars to refer to the phenomenon observed by Doyle and to 
the debate which aroused among political scientist after the publication of Doyle’s article, 
here is used with the second meaning, to refer to the successive interpretations of the 
hypothesis. 
3 RAWLS, J., The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1999. The book was preceded 
by an article, The Law of Peoples, “Critical Inquiry”, 20 (1), 1993, pp. 36–68. 
4 Realism is a long-lasting tradition of political thought and it embraces many different 
interpretations on the characteristics of the international system as well as on the nature of the 
interactions among states. For a general overview of the main realist theories of international 
relations, see BROWN, C., Structural realism, classical realism and human nature, “International 
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absence of a central authority in the international system; it implies also the 
(Hobbesian) notion of state of war. So, the international realm is the environment 
where conflict is always probable, lacking an authority who can settle disputes 
among rational actors.5 Moreover, realist scholars assume that international 
cooperation is highly problematic and always contingent, because states within 
the international system face some ‘dilemmas’, often schematised through 
‘games’, where states are considered to be monolithic unities acting strategically 
to realize their own interest.6 Thus, alliances within the system are always 
difficult to realise and rather unstable. Realist students maintain that every state 
is pushed by systemic constraints to act pursuing their own interest, and that 
when interests clash, states engage in war, notwithstanding the nature of their 
regimes.7 However, states can limit the occurrence of war adopting prudence – i.e., 
a ‘policy of safety’ – as the mainstay of their foreign policy, acting to pursue their 
own interest while maximizing security.8 Given the fact that they look for 
systemic explanations, realist scholars tend to consider that all the units within 
the system act – or, more precisely, react – following a same logic, irrespectively of 
their internal characteristics. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
relations”, 23 (2), 2009, pp. 257–270; WILLIAMS, M.C., The Realist Tradition and the Limits of 
International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2005. A concise historical analysis on the 
heritage of the classics of political thought for realism can be found in PORTINARO, P.P., Il 
realismo politico, Laterza, 1999.  
5 I refer here to the basic concepts of classic realism in international relations, whose 
pillars have been clearly stated in CARR, E.H., The Twenty Year’s Crisis: 1919-1939, 
Macmillan & co., 1951; MORGENTHAU, H., Politics Among Nations, A. Knopf, 1973. For a 
thorough study on realism in international relations, see DONNELLY, J., Realism and 
International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
6 For a comprehensive discussion of the problem, see JERVIS, R., Cooperation Under the 
Security Dilemma, “World Politics”, 30 (1), 1978. Doyle in his article considers some of the 
classical ‘games’ which are used to explain the behaviour of states in realist theories, and 
he accepts that, when confronted with non-liberal states, democratic states face the same 
coordination problems. Therefore, he does not deny the validity of the ‘stag dilemma’, the 
‘security dilemma’ and the ‘chicken game’ as analytical instruments; on the contrary, he 
claims that games represent normal problems for the establishment of any stable 
framework of cooperation among states with different regimes. However, according to 
Doyle the games have no explanatory value when the context under consideration is the 
‘separate peace’. 
7 WALTZ, K.N., Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, 1979. The concept of 
‘interest’ has many interpretations expressed in a wide range of realist theories. Here I 
refer to it in general, preferring the word ‘interest’ to other expressions used in the 
literature – e.g. ‘national interest’ – in order to embrace any possible definition. For a 
discussion of the concept within the realist tradition, see DONNELLY, J., Realism and 
International Relations, pp. 45 ff. 
8 For an interesting discussion on the concept of prudence in international relations, see BROWN, 
C., Practice, Prudence and International Relations Theory: Bourdieu, Aristotle and the Classical 
Realists, “Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies, 4 (1), 2012, pp. 27–46. 
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Doyle adopts a different (liberal) perspective on the nature of the international 
system as well as on the interactions between states.9 Moreover, he challenges the 
realist idea that regimes do not matter when analysing states’ foreign policies: his 
basic idea is that, if we consider how liberal and authoritarian states conduct their 
foreign policies, it is possible to observe some relevant differences. He wants to 
present liberalism as a paradigm for international relations, through the 
formulation of a “tested, causal theory”.10 To demonstrate that “liberals are 
fundamentally different” from non-liberal states in the way they conduct foreign 
policy, he points out that during the past two centuries a “liberal zone of peace”, 
or “liberal union”, has been informally established and maintained by liberal 
states, thanks to the development of “conventions of mutual respect” which 
formed a “cooperative foundation” for relations among them.11 Also, it does not 
seem to be the case that in this informal union the establishment of peace is 
contingent (i.e., limited to the mere absence of war), because not only war did not 
occurred for a long period, but to wage war against a fellow democratic state is no 
longer conceived of as a legitimate means to pursue foreign policy goals. 
Therefore, the probability of a war arising between democracies tends to zero.12 
Thus, Doyle argues that within the democratic union a “state of peace” has been 
established, leaving no room for the possibility of intra-union wars.  
To support his intuition, Doyle analyses the database provided by Small and 
Singer about the occurrence of (international) wars during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries and observes that none of the wars fought during this period 
involved democracies fighting against other democracies.13 Moreover, Doyle 
maintains that, even when democracies get involved in important wars – for 
instance, during the world wars – they tend to cluster to form an alliance opposed 
to non-liberal states.14 However, he does not claim that democracies are 
intrinsically peaceful; on the contrary, he states that they are “as aggressive and 
war prone as any other form of government” when they deal with non-liberal 
states, because outside the “pacific union” they face the international state of war, 
being subject to the same ‘dilemmas’ found by realist students.15 Besides, Doyle 
circumscribes his hypothesis specifying that the “separate peace” involves only 
“constitutionally secure liberal states”, so excluding from the liberal union new-
born, unstable democracies, which would represent exceptions to the general 
                                                          
9 See DOYLE, M.W. and RECCHIA, S., Liberalism in International Relations, in International 
Encyclopedia of Political Science, edited by B. Badie, D. Berg-Schlosser and L. Morlino, 
SAGE, 2011, pp. 1434–1439. 
10 DOYLE, M.W., Ways of War and Peace, Norton, 1997, p. 285. 
11 DOYLE, M.W., Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs – Part 1. 
12 DOYLE, M.W., Ways of War and Peace, p. 285. 
13 SMALL, M. and SINGER, J.D., Resort to Arms, Sage Publications, 1982. 
14 DOYLE, M.W., Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs – Part 1, p. 213-216. 
15 DOYLE, M.W., Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs – Part 2, p. 225. 
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explanation. Thus, in new-born democracies the benign effects of liberalism on 
pacification come after an assessment period.16 Indeed, time is a crucial variable: 
as a matter of fact, one of the features that make the democratic union stable is 
the growth of mutual trust and respect among liberal states thanks to a 
continuing cooperation.17 But, as democracies don’t recognize authoritarian states 
as legitimised forms of government – authoritarian governments lack not only 
democratic, but also moral legitimacy, because they are perceived to be the 
aggressors of their own peoples – the lack of trust pushes democracies to abandon 
prudence and to commit what Doyle calls the “failings” of a liberal foreign 
policy.18 Thus, exactly those features which permitted to establish trust and 
continuous cooperation among democracies make liberal foreign policies 
particularly aggressive in their relationship towards non-liberal states. Doyle 
distinguishes three typical failings of liberal foreign policy when democracies deal 
with non-liberal states. 
On the one hand, powerful liberal states are not able to adopt an effective and 
balanced diplomacy when dealing with powerful non-liberal states, and they tend 
to show an imperialist and interventionist attitude towards weak non-liberal 
states, often with the intention of provoking or helping a change in the regime. 
However, although liberal states pursue ‘liberal’ foreign policies – aimed at 
spreading liberal principles such as the protection of human rights, or electoral 
democracy – their alliances and the means they use abroad are not always 
coherent with the declared goals.19 On the other hand, declining or non-
consolidated (to put it simply, weak) liberal states tend to make the opposite 
mistake, abstaining from involvement in conflicts and adopting an isolationist 
line, relying on an allied liberal state more powerful.20 Furthermore, all liberal 
states appear to lack a coherent policy regarding the matters of humanitarian aid 
                                                          
16 On the definition of ‘newborn’ or ‘unsettled’ democracy, see GRILLI DI CORTONA, P., Come 
gli Stati diventano democratici, Laterza, 2009; DIAMOND, L., Developing Democracy. Toward 
Consolidation, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 64–116; MARCH, J.G. and 
OLSEN, J.P., Rediscovering Institutions. The Organisational Basis of Politics, The Free Press, 
1989, pp. 53–68. 
17 DOYLE, M.W., Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs – Part 1, p. 230. Similarly, 
time is a crucial factor for the development of stable democratic institutions, insofar as the 
consolidation of a liberal political culture is concerned. See DIAMOND, L., Developing 
Democracy, pp. 161–217. 
18 DOYLE, M.W., Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs – Part 2, pp. 325 ff. The 
process is better explained in Ways of War and Peace, p. 282. 
19 DOYLE, M.W., Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs – Part 2, p. 328 ff. Here Doyle 
analyzes the ‘failings’ in US foreign policies during the Cold War period, both towards the 
Soviet Union and towards weak Third World states. Particularly, he stresses how finally 
liberal policies in the Third World failed to promote human rights. 
20 Doyle mentions the example of Western European states and Japan during the Cold 
War. 
A refutation of democratic peace assumptions in liberal projects for global order 
 
267 
 
and international redistribution of welfare in the Third World. This last failing 
limits the attractive potential of liberal principles in non-liberal states and 
increases suspect and distrust within the system.21 
To sum up, it is important to stress that Doyle’s idea of separate peace does 
not imply the assumption of an intrinsic peacefulness of liberal states; it rather 
advances a plausible interpretation of a striking phenomenon – the absence of war 
between liberal states – based on the argument that liberalism affects the content 
and form of foreign policy. Indeed, liberal principles would make democracies act 
with a double standard: they would be peaceful and cooperative towards other 
democracies, and suspicious and aggressive towards non-liberal states. It should 
be kept in mind that Doyle’s article pursues two main aims: the first one is to 
refute the realist idea that any foreign policy is determined only by systemic 
constraints, irrespectively of states’ regimes, arguing instead that liberal states 
adopt similar foreign policies;22 the second one is to warn liberal scholars (and 
liberal governments) of the need to adopt a prudent foreign policy towards the 
Soviet bloc and the Third World – in line with the realist principle of a ‘policy of 
safety’ – in order to find a modus vivendi based on respect, and to avoid the 
excesses that a liberal fanatic policy causes. Thus, the separate peace is not a 
normative ideal; it is rather a political analysis of liberal foreign policies, aimed at 
proposing an alternative way of implementing liberal principles when acting in 
the international realm. 
 
Kantian elements in Doyle’s separate peace 
 
Doyle maintains that one of the causes of the double effect of liberal principles in 
shaping liberal foreign policies – cooperative attitude towards fellow liberal states, 
aggressive attitude and crusade spirit towards non-liberals – is the “inadequate 
guidance” of liberal theorists in the explanation of the phenomenon of “liberal 
                                                          
21 See BEATE, J., Liberal Internationalism. Theory, History, Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 
especially Chapter 4. For a skeptical view about the peacefulness of democratic foreign policy, 
see BARKAWI, T. and LAFFEY, M., The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization, 
“European Journal of International Relations”, 5 (4), 1999, pp. 403-434; MACMILLAN, J., 
Whose Democracy, which Peace? Contextualising the Democratic Peace, “International Politics”, 
41 (4), 2004, pp. 427-493. 
22 For a recent study proposing a new perspective on how values influence foreign policy, see 
KERTZER, J.D., POWERS, K.E., RATHBUN, B.C., IYER, R., Moral Support: How Moral Values 
Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes, “The Journal of Politics”, 76 (3), 2014, pp. 825–840. Drawing on 
an original dataset obtained from surveys, the authors argue that «while the idealistic foreign 
policies of humanitarianism and multilateralism (‘cooperative internationalism’) are grounded 
in an Enlightenment morality that values the individual, foreign policies that involve the use of 
force (‘militant internationalism’) are equally morally motivated, but by values that emphasize 
the protection of the community» (p. 826). 
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pacification”.23 The main problem in classical views about liberalism is the wrong 
assumption that liberal states are intrinsically peaceful because of the 
peacefulness of their citizens or because of the benign effects of commerce on 
international relations. Doyle focuses on Immanuel Kant’s attempt to describe 
the process of pacification of the whole world thanks to the stimulus and guidance 
of republican states, as it was presented in 1795 in Toward Perpetual Peace.24  
This section analyses five main points of continuity and discontinuity between 
Kant’s “pacific league” (or pacific federation) project and Doyle’s separate peace 
hypothesis, in order to demonstrate that, although the separate peace explanation 
takes inspiration from liberal philosophy, it has a different aim – explanatory 
rather than normative. Acknowledging this enables to realise that assuming one 
or the other version to ground philosophical projects of global order might have 
different implications. 
 
A. Elements of continuity 
 
A common worry both for Kant and Doyle is the focus on inter-state war in their 
approach to international relations: civil wars, or intra-state conflicts, are not held 
into account. This is perfectly understandable from Kant’s perspective, because he 
considered states and multinational empires as the only relevant actors capable of 
waging war, the only ones which, banning war from their relations, could realize 
perpetual peace. Doyle too focuses almost exclusively on inter-state wars. He only 
incidentally mentions civil wars when describing the undesired non-liberal outputs 
of liberal foreign policy in cases of covert operations aimed at protecting or 
sustaining non-liberal allies. However, in the 1990s one of the main problems for 
security came from the implosion of multinational political entities like 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and centrifugal tendencies jeopardized also 
some liberal states – for instance, Spain and Belgium. In many occasions, facing 
these challenges, liberal states acted with the same spirit of “crusade” that Doyle 
found in their attitude towards non-liberal states. Thus, an analysis of 
participation of liberal states in this kind of conflicts does not seem to be 
superfluous in order to verify the existence of a separate peace, or a distinctively 
liberal conduct of foreign policy.25 
                                                          
23 DOYLE, M.W., Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs – Part 1, p. 225. 
24 KANT, I., Toward Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Project, in Id., Practical Philosophy, 
translated and edited by M.J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, 1996. For an analysis 
of the Kantian conception of peace, see LORETONI, A., Pace e progresso in Kant, Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane, 2006. 
25 For a defense of a pragmatic approach to foreign policy that justifies alliances with illiberal 
regimes and rejects activist accounts of liberal internationalism insofar as these measures help 
to protect the liberal community and its ethos, see ETZIONI, A., Security First. For a Muscular, 
Moral Foreign Policy, Yale University Press, 2007. For a critical interpretation of 
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Another interesting point is the easy transposition of the concept of 
‘republicanism’ into the contemporary concept of ‘democracy’, a move that is not 
clearly explained in Doyle’s text.26 Indeed, the constitutions described by Kant 
and Doyle appear slightly different, not only because of the two centuries dividing 
these authors and the different sociopolitical contexts that they analyze, but also 
because of the difficulty of finding an acceptable definition of ‘liberal state’ or 
‘democracy’ which might include both Kantian republics and actual democracies. 
Furthermore, assuming that we can find a similar concept, its extension to states 
in the non-ideal (real) world would be problematic, and it would leave room to a 
number of unclear or hybrid cases that would make it extremely difficult to build 
a theory on them.27 Indeed, Doyle’s article has been criticised for the inaccuracy 
of the cases presented in order to support his hypothesis.28 Perhaps it is possible to 
find some common features between the two forms of government if we consider 
that republics in 1795 and liberal states nowadays are both representative systems 
based on the rule of law with a clear separation of legislative and executive 
powers,29 in which citizens can openly express their preferences about 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
inconsistencies in liberal foreign policy, see Risse-Kappen, T., Democratic Peace – Warlike 
Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument, “European Journal of 
International Relations”, 1 (4), pp. 491-577. 
26 On this critique of the easy translation from a modern concept of republicanism into a 
contemporary concept of democracy, see CATTANEO, F., L’idea di repubblica da Kant a 
Habermas, Giappichelli, 2013; GATES, S., KNUTSEN, T.L. and MOSES, J.W., Democracy and 
Peace: a More Skeptical View, “Journal of Peace Research”, 33 (1), 1996, p. 1–10; 
Cattaneo. Particularly, the authors maintain that the democratic peace literature suffers 
from the poor theoretical foundation of its arguments and the difficult operationalization 
of the two variables involved – democracy and war/peace. Interestingly, they also argue 
that because of the doubts about democracy expressed there, Kant’s Perpetual Peace 
cannot be the only inspiring work for the democratic peace literature. They propose to 
delve deeper in the philosophical literature produced during the Enlightement to study 
authors more supportive of the virtues of democracy. On this, see GATES, S., KNUTSEN, 
T.L. and MOSES, J.W., Democracy and Peace, p. 6, fn 15. For a discussion of how authority 
and obligation interact in the Kantian normative account of the state which explains the 
skepticism toward democracy, see MALIKS, R., Kant, the State, and Revolution, “Kantian 
Review”, 18 (1), 2013, pp. 29–47. 
27 The difficulties of conceptualizing democracy interested both political scientists and 
political theorists. Some examples: DAHL, R.A., On Democracy, Yale University Press, 
1998; HUNTINGTON, S.P., How Countries Democratize, “Political Science Quarterly”, 106 
(4), 1991-1992, pp. 579–616; BOBBIO, N., Il Futuro della Democrazia, Einaudi, 1984; Il 
problema della guerra e le vie della pace, Il Mulino, 1997, or. ed. 1979. 
28 For a brief review of the main contributions to the democratic peace debate see 
ANDREATTA, F., Democrazia e Politica Internazionale: Pace Separata e Democratizzazione 
del Sistema Internazionale, “Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica”, XXXV (2), 2005, pp. 1–
16. 
29 The republican form of government is, for Kant, the only one which is «in conformity 
with the concept of right» in virtue of its representative system. See KANT, I., Toward 
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government. However, in Doyle’s text this transposition appears to be an easy 
move, which would probably need further clarification, especially in order to 
explain the hard cases which seem to weaken the force of the ‘separate peace’ 
hypothesis.  
 
B. Elements of discontinuity 
 
First of all, there is a fundamental difference of genre between the two works 
under consideration: while Kant proposed a normative account of interstate 
relations, an ideal application of the command of reason at the international level 
that is coherent with the whole Kantian project devoted to the triumph of reason, 
Doyle looks at the reality of international relations and attempts to explain a 
phenomenon – the apparent lack of wars between democratic states – which he 
considers to be the actual realization of the Kantian pacific league. Thus, whereas 
for Kant a state of peace funded on liberal principles is the end of a process 
voluntarily undertaken by republics but ideally involving all states, for Doyle the 
state of peace is the output of a slow and non-linear learning process – the 
development of trust from continuing cooperation – which guarantees friendly 
relations among liberal states, but at the same time worsens the quality of the 
relations between liberal and non-liberal states.  
Moreover, in his philosophical sketch Kant envisaged a federation of 
republican states – a pacific league – as the best means to realize a state of peace, 
i.e., an international order where states, following reason, comply with the moral 
duty of banning war “as a procedure for determining rights” and eventually 
realizing a world where states behave in conformity with the concept of right.30 
The idea of moral duty is present also in Doyle’s interpretation, but only as a 
useful rhetoric tool adopted by democratic governments in order to justify their 
aggressive attitude towards non-liberal states, although sometimes the same 
democracies elude this moral duty, when they find it convenient to ally with non-
liberal states for realizing geopolitical goals. However, Doyle maintains that the 
moral scope of liberalism should not be the base of liberal foreign policy, because 
there is a concrete risk that a similar policy would be caused by fanaticism or 
would hide imperialism. So, Doyle introduces an element of realism in his liberal 
approach to foreign policy analysis, maintaining that prudence should always 
drive states’ actions irrespectively of the nature of their founding values.  
In Kant’s text there are some ambiguous points regarding the ban of war, 
which have been already exhaustively debated in the literature, particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Perpetual Peace, p. 325. Like Kant, Doyle identifies the main feature of liberalism in the 
importance attributed to moral freedom, a principle which founds rights and 
(representative) institutions: DOYLE, M.W., Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs – 
Part 1, p. 206. 
30 KANT, I., Toward Perpetual Peace, p. 325–327. 
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about the legitimate means republics might adopt in order to “extend further and 
further” the pacific league.31 As a matter of fact, while reason absolutely 
condemns war, nature uses war as a means to drive people everywhere on the 
Earth’s surface and to compel people to leave the state of nature and establish 
(law-regulated) social relations.32 Thus, as reason through nature finally affirms 
its own end, i.e., “the rule of right”,33 it seems that from Kant’s perspective war is 
not totally irrational; on the contrary, it can serve reason to realize its design, 
whose final end is perpetual peace.34 The classic question about how the pacific 
league would expand is indeed a challenging one, to which scholars give different 
answers, depending on their preferred interpretation of the Kantian text. Did 
Kant think that non-republican states could be forced to join the league, for 
instance in case of violation of cosmopolitan right? Or rather, did he assume that 
the example of republican states, conformingly to reason, would be the only mean 
to enlarge the union? The Kantian text about the possibilities of war after the 
establishment of the union is ambiguous, and it does not seem possible to give a 
definite answer on this point.35 Nonetheless, it is interesting to point out that 
Doyle recognizes that, while liberal states in the ‘union’ seem to act conformingly 
to the first interpretation – they wage war and adopt non-liberal means to protect 
and enlarge the liberal community –, they should rather pursue consistency to 
liberal principles. This would mean to actively promote human rights even in 
allied non-liberal states and to work towards progressive institutional innovations 
in the global economy. Doyle maintains that they should also prefer a policy of 
accommodation with  non-liberal states (be they weak or powerful), because 
liberalism cannot “politically sustain non-liberal policies”.  
Finally, the role that Kant and Doyle assign to citizens of republics and liberal 
states is different: on the one hand, Kant considers the citizens of republican 
states to be fundamentally peaceful, insofar as they are interested in avoiding the 
costs of a war, and publicity of the government’s decisions about war would be a 
guarantee of a commitment to realize perpetual peace; on the other hand, Doyle 
points out that liberal states often are pushed to wage war because of the demands 
coming from civil society, or they rely on their peoples’ support when they declare 
                                                          
31 KANT, I., Toward Perpetual Peace, p. 327. For a reconstruction of Kant’s ideas about the 
realisation of perpetual peace and especially the possibility of fighting for it, see MALIKS, 
R., Kant’s Politics in Context, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 144–167.  
32 KANT, I., Toward Perpetual Peace, p. 327. 
33 KANT, I., Toward Perpetual Peace, p. 334. In the First Supplement to the treaty Kant 
defines the end of reason as the synthesis of «the right of a state, the right of nations and the 
cosmopolitan right».  
34 KANT, I., Toward Perpetual Peace, p. 335–336. 
35 For differing views on this problem see MERTENS, T., From Perpetual Peace to the Law of 
Peoples, “Kantian Review”, 6, 2002, pp. 60–84; FRANCESCHET, A., Sovereignty and 
Freedom: Immanuel Kant’s Liberal Internationalist ‘Legacy’, “Review of International 
Studies”, 27, 2001, pp. 209–238.  
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to act conformingly to liberal principles. Thus, while the former sees citizens – i.e., 
free moral individuals – as the agents ultimately responsible for the realization of 
peace, Doyle tends to identify liberal states as the unique agents responsible for a 
peace-generating foreign policy. Doyle does not mention international 
organizations, NGOs and transnational citizens’ associations are not even 
mentioned as possible promoters of a peaceful coexistence in the international 
system. Thus, the same goal of preserving peace seems to be incorporated in the 
interest of each single liberal state, rather than being a desirable status which 
would improve the conditions of the whole humankind. 
To conclude, it is worth noticing that Doyle’s idea of ‘going back to Kant’ to 
frame a hypothesis based on the empirical evidence of a separate peace among 
democracies regarding the contemporary international system has provoked a 
lively debate on the relationship between democracy and peace. By now, the 
existence of a link between these two variables is seldom questioned,36 although 
the establishment of the very nature of this link has proven to be difficult and 
involved many scholars. However, one should worry about two 
misunderstandings regarding this relationship which are recurrent in this 
literature. Firstly, Doyle attempted at explaining the separate peace adopting 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace in order to highlight the liberal foundations of democratic 
regimes, basically rediscovering and accepting the Kantian intuition that it is 
possible to interpret states’ foreign policy rejecting the realist account of the 
international state of war. Secondly, he does not accept the Kantian optimistic 
idea that liberal foreign policy is necessarily peaceful and he criticised the utopian 
view that it would lead tout court to the realization of a durable and universal state 
of peace. Quite on the contrary, Doyle warns against the dangers of liberal foreign 
policy which underestimates the realist advice to prudence as the mainstay of a 
liberal state’s conduct of international relations. 
 
 
2. The democratic peace assumption: back to liberal theories 
 
Doyle attempted to explain a phenomenon – the absence of wars among liberal 
states during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – starting with a 
philosophical suggestion, the liberal idea that only the spreading of rights and 
citizens’ representation – in one word, liberalism – can assure a stable peace. 
Indeed, Doyle corrected this idealistic vision limiting its scope through the 
demonstration that the pacific union includes only fellow (mature, i.e. 
                                                          
36 GILBERT, A., Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic 
Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 12. See also 
LEVY, J.S., Domestic Politics and War, “Journal of Interdisciplinary History”, 18 (4), 
1988, pp. 653–673. Levy considers the absence of war between democracies to be almost an 
‘empirical law’ of international relations, see Domestic Politics and War, p. 662.  
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“constitutional secure”) liberal states; indeed, it not only excludes non-liberal 
states, but war among states with different regimes becomes more probable than 
it would be in a ‘realist world’, where alliances were not stable and states waged 
war regardless of the nature of their own or their opponent’s regime. Another 
correction to the liberal ‘utopia’ of perpetual peace provided by Doyle regards the 
supposed intrinsic peacefulness of democracies: liberal states show that they fight 
wars as often as non-liberal states. Moreover, usually they win the wars that they 
fight, and sometimes with peace they impose on the defeated enemy the adoption 
of a liberal-democratic regime.37  
As already mentioned, many authors attempted to better operationalize the 
variables considered by Doyle – war and democracy – in order to explain the ‘hard 
cases’ and build a fully-fledged theory about the relationship between democracy 
and war.38 However, none of the explanations proposed so far appears to be 
conclusive and convincing, and the same causal nexus ‘democracy → peace’ has 
been questioned and its ‘capsizing’ (peace → democracy) has often been put 
forward.39 Also, some scholars noticed that it is impossible to explain the apparent 
absence of war between democracies referring to a unique, internal cause – the 
democratic regime. Rather, they propose to look for multi-causal explanations,40 
or to analyze the phenomenon as a process rather than as a given, in order to 
identify the historical patterns of pacification among Western states and consider 
the possibility that they will occur again in the future, eventually involving non-
liberal states.41 
                                                          
37 For a recent discussion of the issue that starts from an analysis of Kant’s thought to 
investigate contemporary theories, see EBERL, O. and NIESEN, P., Nessuna pace col «nemico 
ingiusto»? Se sia lecito imporgli la democrazia dopo averlo sconfitto, Trauben, 2014. 
38 See LEVY, J.S., Domestic politics and war. “Journal of Interdisciplinary History”, 18 (4), 
1988, pp. 653–673; RUSSETT, B. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold 
War World, Princeton University Press, 1993. For a review, see CHERNOFF, F., (2004), The 
Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International Relations, “International Studies 
Review”, 6 (1), pp. 49–78. 
39 For a discussion on the different interpretations on this causal nexus and its implications for 
liberal (especially cosmopolitan) projects of global order see ARCHIBUGI, D., The Global 
Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy, Princeton University Press, 2008, 
pp. 62 ff. It would be impossible to present an account of all the main works devoted to the 
discussion of the link between democracy and peace; some of them – written in the 
aftermath of the end of the Cold War – became particularly influential. See, for instance; 
FUKUYAMA, F., The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, 1992; RUSSETT, B. 
Grasping the Democratic Peace; PANEBIANCO, A., Guerrieri democratici. Le democrazie e la 
politica di potenza, Il Mulino, 1997; BONANATE, L., Democrazia tra le nazioni, Bruno 
Mondadori Editore, 2001. 
40 GATES, S., KNUTSEN, T.L. and MOSES, J.W., Democracy and Peace, p. 7. 
41 CEDERMAN, L-E., Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical 
Learning Process, “American Political Science Review”, 95 (1), 2001, pp. 15–31.  
ELISA PIRAS 
 
274 
 
When these authors refer to the democratic peace in general, they usually refer 
to the phenomenon – the absence of war – or to the simplified explanation – 
democracies do not fight against other democracies because of their liberal-
democratic features. As this second meaning is usually adopted by liberal 
theorists, their philosophical proposals suffer from vagueness.  
 
The following paragraphs demonstrate that the democratic peace is not an 
adequate premise for founding philosophical projects aimed at realizing a liberal 
conception of global order through which peace and human rights can be assured 
to all individuals. Particularly, because of the assumption of the democratic 
peace, the Rawlsian project is weakened: their scope is limited and the same 
liberal character of their projects is questionable because of the assumption of the 
‘democratic peace’ as a mainstay of the international system.  
 
The democratic peace as a basic fact of the international system  
  
Rawls’s proposal of a Law of Peoples aims at challenging the classical realist 
conception of international relations as the sphere of power struggles in a context 
of anarchy, proposing an alternative Kantian conception of foedus pacificum 
among well-ordered societies – i.e., liberal states –42 in order to make the 
international system “stable for the right reasons” and realize a durable and 
universal “state of peace”, or “peace by satisfaction”, avoiding the occurrence in 
the future of “the great evils of human history” which follow from political 
injustice.43  
                                                          
42 Rawls explicitly refers to the model of Kant’s Toward Perpetual Peace when he presents his 
proposal for an alternative to realist theories of international relations. The updated version of 
the foedus pacificum is the Society of Peoples. Rawls is not the only political theorist who 
contributed to the revival of the Kantian proposal for bringing about perpetual peace. For 
instance, Habermas has widely discussed the opportunity of See HABERMAS, J., Kant’s Idea of 
Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years’ Historical Remove, in Id., The Inclusion of the Other: 
Studies in Political Theory, MIT Press, 1998, or. ed. 1995, pp. 167–201. He has later developed 
his ideas on the international order in a number of essays, such as The Postnational Constellation 
and the Future of Democracy, in Id., The Postnational Constellation. Political Essays, MIT Press, 
2001, or. ed. 1998, pp. 58–112; A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World Society?, in Id., 
Between Naturalism and Religion, Polity Press, 2008, or. ed. 2005, pp. 312–352. Habermas 
considers the diffusion of democratic institutions as essential to the realisation of a stable peace, 
not only as far as the state level is concerned, but also beyond the state. For a reconstruction of 
the Habermasian conception of international order with explicit reference to the Kantian 
legacy, see ROULET, G., Habermas sur la paix perpétuelle. De la difficulté d’une philosohie 
politique de la globalization, in Kant Cosmopolitique, edited by Y.C. Zarka, C. Guibet Lafaye, 
Editions de l’Éclat, 2008, pp. 157–173; FINE, R. and SMITH, W., Jurgen Habermas’s Theory of 
Cosmopolitanism, “Constellations”, 10 (4), 2003, pp. 469–487. 
43 RAWLS, J., The Law of Peoples, pp. 6–7. The idea of ‘peace by satisfaction’, which is 
adopted also by Doyle, was proposed by Aron in his seminal work on international 
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The starting point of Rawls’s reflection on the Law of Peoples is the idea of 
extending justice as fairness beyond the borders of liberal societies, although this 
extension presents several problems because of the structural differences in the 
societies analyzed. Indeed, in the first society the basic units are free moral 
persons (bound together in a fairly cooperating community), whereas in the 
international system Rawls identifies “peoples”, as distinct from states, as the 
main relevant actors. Peoples have a moral character and they lack some 
attributes of traditional sovereignty; moreover, the individuals forming a people 
share a common conception of right and justice. Although societies usually 
organize themselves through states, only well-ordered societies deserve to be called 
peoples and can be considered the legitimate members of the Society of Peoples. 
For this reason, only democratic and “decent” states can take part in the Society 
of Peoples,44 where “great evils” cannot happen because political injustice has 
been defeated internally by functioning liberal institutions and true equality 
among peoples is guaranteed. Like citizens in the national context, peoples 
constituting the Society are considered to be free, equal and reasonable, and in 
their mutual relations they voluntarily comply with the Law of Peoples. Ideally, 
the eight principles constituting the Law of Peoples, are those which, being 
recognized as basic principles of political justice governing peoples’ conduct, 
representatives of free, equal and reasonable peoples would debate in a second-
level original position.45 Complying with the Law of Peoples, a process of moral 
learning through which peoples develop mutual trust and confidence in one 
another leads peoples to establish a state of peace.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
relations. He presents a classification of the different forms of peace among nations. See 
ARON, R., Paix et guerre entre les nations, Calmann-Lévy, 1962. 
44 RAWLS, J., The Law of Peoples, p. 29. 
45 RAWLS, J., The Law of Peoples, p. 33–37. The eight principles’ list is at p. 37: 
 
I. «Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples. II. People are to observe treaties and undertakings. III. People are equals and are parties to the agreements that bind them. IV. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. V. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons 
other than self-defense.” VI. Peoples are to honor human rights. VII. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. VIII. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions 
that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime». 
 
For Rawls’s discussion of the eight principles, see pp. 37–42. For different interpretations 
of the implications of Rawls’s choice of principles with a particular interest for the 
conduct of foreign policy, see KIM, H., A Stability Interpretation of Rawls’s The Law of 
Peoples, “Political Theory”, online, 2014; BLAKE, M., Justice and Foreign Policy, Oxford 
University Press, 2013; LEAVITT, N., The Foreign Policy of John Rawls and Amartya Sen, 
Lexington Books, 2013; LLOYD WILLIAMS, H., On Rawls, Development and Global Justice. 
The Freedom of Peoples, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
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The optimistic vision proposed by Rawls of an international system where 
eventually peace becomes the normal condition of international relations’ conduct 
is based on the concept of realistic utopia and on the possibility of reconciling 
ourselves with our social world: 
 
Our hope for the future rests on the belief that the possibilities of our 
social world allow a reasonably just constitutional democratic society 
living as a member of a reasonably just Society of Peoples. An essential 
step to being reconciled with our social world is to see that such a 
Society of Peoples is indeed possible.46 
  
Rawls argues that the trust in the possibility of a democratic international society 
constituted by democratic peoples is well-founded, because of four ‘basic facts’ of 
the international system, which are four actual features of the current 
international system: 
 
1. The Fact of Reasonable Pluralism 
2. The Fact of Democratic Unity in Diversity 
3. The Fact of Public Reason 
4. The Fact of Democratic Peace 
 
Whereas facts 1., 2. and 3. are internal characteristics of liberal democratic 
societies, fact 4. concerns the normal conduct of international relations among 
liberal peoples. Rawls infers that the fourth fact can easily be extended to include 
the relations between liberal and ‘decent’ peoples. Indeed, although they do not 
have a democratic regime, decent people are not expansionist and their 
governments act on the basis of a shared – though not pluralistic neither 
egalitarian – conception of justice, which is accepted by the citizens. 
Regarding the fact of democratic peace, Rawls shows an enthusiastic approval 
to Doyle’s discovery of an “empirical regularity” within the international system. 
He goes further, demonstrating that the possibility of democratic peace is not 
incompatible with the actual – i.e., non-ideal – democracies. In his opinion, there 
is no need to wait for the existence of ideal, flawless democracies since the 
democratic peace is already a fact. Five institutional features secure a peace by 
satisfaction among democracies and make them less likely to engage in war, even 
against non-liberal “outlaw regimes”: fair equality of opportunity; decent 
distribution of income and wealth; society as employer of last resort; basic health 
care assured for all; public financing of elections and availability of public 
information on matters of policy.47 Thus, Rawls concludes, the possession of these 
                                                          
46 RAWLS, J., The Law of Peoples, p. 124. 
47 RAWLS, J., The Law of Peoples, pp. 48–50. 
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five minimal democratic requirements “supports the idea of a democratic peace”.48 
However, the fact that democracies by nature – that is, in consequence of their 
basic structure – are less likely to engage in war does not ban war from the 
international system: democratic peoples never resort to war to pursue their 
interest or to solve disputes, but they can do it only against outlaw regimes in a 
few exceptional cases: legitimate self-defence, legitimate defence of allies and 
intervention to protect foreign populations in severe cases of basic human rights 
violation. 
 
  
3. A shaky liberal project for global order? 
 
From the preceding sections, it should be clear that Rawls adopted an 
oversimplified version of Doyle’s explanation and mistakenly assumed it to be a 
general law of the international system. This section argues that this caused a 
weakening of the same idea of “realistic utopia”, because, given the limited 
validity of this ‘empirical’ assumption, the ‘realistic basis’ of his normative project 
is shaky and therefore its theoretical solidity and practical feasibility result 
questionable – leaving itself open to criticisms regarding its utopian character.  
Indeed, Rawls maintains that democracies during the last two centuries have 
been building a pacific system – a “security community” – and he stresses the 
institutional features that make cooperation among democracies stable. Moreover, 
he proposes the example of the European Union as the biggest and the most 
effective democratic security community in the world. In so doing, he refers to the 
evidence offered not only in Doyle’s article, but also in a number of studies. 
However, Rawls seems to undervalue the prudential content of Doyle’s 
contribution on the separate peace: he does not admit that undesired effects like 
democracies’ aggressive attitude towards non-democratic states – for instance, in 
the case of covert operations – can be caused by the same liberal values that 
permitted to found a lasting peace among democracies.  
Firstly, his explanation for the hard cases when the ‘law’ of democratic peace 
fails does not question the validity of this law, but looks at the imperfection of the 
existing democratic systems. Thus, Rawls’s conclusion is that the exceptions to 
the democratic peace are caused by ‘various failures in a democracy’s essential 
supporting institutions and practices’.49 That was the case for the US in different 
periods of their history, when economic interests attained to control the political 
elite; however, when all (democratic) societies tend to realize the ideal of justice as 
fairness, they choose to adopt a foreign policy course inspired by and complying 
with the eight principles of the Law of Peoples. Secondly, the many criticisms 
                                                          
48 RAWLS, J., The Law of Peoples, p. 51. 
49 RAWLS, J., The Law of Peoples, p. 53. 
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moved toward Doyle’s explanation of the phenomenon of separate peace, 
particularly those regarding the difficult operationalization of the two concepts of 
democracy and war, would have required careful consideration, a reassessment of 
its explanatory potential and a more prudent inclusion of its conclusions within a 
normative projects. However, Rawls paid no attention at those criticisms. As a 
matter of fact, it is difficult to explain the nature of the relation between 
democracy and war. Moreover, it seems impossible to adopt any possible 
explanation as a general law of politics, because, for instance, the fact that during 
a certain period of time democracies never fought one against the other is not 
sufficient evidence to conclude that in the future they will never do it. At the same 
time, we cannot exclude that among non-liberal states similar dynamics might 
emerge and produce other, non-liberal, forms of separate peace.  
Furthermore, as during the last two centuries the same concept of democracy 
changed considerably, it is impossible to exclude that it will change in the future. 
Adopting different definitions of democracy might either confirm the separate 
peace hypothesis or refute it once and forever; thus, the hypothesis’ assumption 
seems to endanger the tenure of the Rawlsian proposal for a liberal-driven Society 
of Peoples. Finally, how can we be sure that the democratic peace hypothesis – 
whose original version was explicitly based on the analysis of democracies’ foreign 
policies – holds also for decent peoples? Is it enough to assume that these peoples 
are not expansionist and that they have a moral character, so relying on the two 
fundamental features that make them members of the Society of Peoples? In 
order to include these societies in the framework, it would be necessary to stretch 
the hypothesis considerably, not only because of the unclear concept of decency 
expressed by Rawls, but also because the relations occurring among liberal and 
non-liberal, non-outlaw societies seem to be quite complex, even at a first glance.  
Another implication of the assumption of the democratic peace as a basic fact 
of the international system is that the Law of Peoples, like similar liberal projects 
for achieving perpetual peace, can only realize a limited peace or relax its liberal 
character. On the one hand, as a matter of fact, even if we admit that the 
democratic peace is a general law of international politics, it seems impossible that 
a Rawlsian Society of Peoples might ever include non-liberal peoples. Because of 
the exclusive character of the Society, non-liberal peoples would stay apart, and 
participate in the liberal-driven international system as enemies (outlaw regimes), 
as backward, needy societies (burdened societies), or as isolationist actors (rentier 
states) with no interest to engage in the redefinition of the political global order. 
Toward these societies war (armed intervention) is possible for the exceptional 
cases mentioned above. Thus, we would expect to have a double-standard 
international system involving both moral and non-moral actors organised in 
states, where a liberal Society of Peoples coexist with non-liberal states, realizing 
an intra-liberal peace but not a general “peace by satisfaction”, which by 
definition would be general and stable. However, this future perspective does not 
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seem so different from the real world that we live in, “here and now”. On the other 
hand, in order to definitely ban war and great evils from the world, all the 
societies in the system should become well-ordered and comply with the Law of 
Peoples in dealing with other societies. Which policies could liberal and decent 
societies adopt in order to enlarge the peaceful community?  
We can imagine two kinds of policies: 
1. proactive policies, aimed at directly changing the regimes in non-well-
ordered societies; 
2. passive policies, promoting regime changes through diplomatic effort, 
developmental aid, conditionality clauses in international treaties, and the 
example of a liberal (or ‘decent’) people consistently complying with the 
Law of Peoples. 
Nevertheless, both solutions would contradict the same foundations of the 
Rawlsian liberal project for global order, particularly with regard to the liberal 
values of international pluralism and equality of peoples.  
First, considering only well-ordered societies as rightful members of the 
Society of Peoples means that the other states within the international system are 
not considered as having a moral character, and this could lead – assuming 
Doyle’s original hypothesis – to a scenario where democracies tend to be 
aggressive towards non-liberal peoples in order to change their regimes, or – 
assuming the simplified version of democratic peace – we can imagine an 
alternative scenario where democracies are sometimes forced to resort to war 
because of the aggressive behaviour of outlaw regimes.  
Second, the problem with passive policies is that in a world of non-ideal 
democracies these policies are never necessarily aimed at causing a regime change 
accordingly with the citizens’ desire, and the same idea of a bright example offered 
by democracies can raise irony and scepticism. Moreover, passive policies seem to 
be useful tools only if the government that democratic governments aim to change 
is cooperative, but this is not always the case. As a matter of fact, usually non-
liberal governments are not so favourably disposed toward conditionalities and 
diplomatic pressures exerted by democracies.50 They tend to choose international 
isolation or non-liberal donors and openly oppose liberal policies of conditional 
development aid and foreign support for internal democratic opponents. 
Finally, the assumption of the democratic peace as a basic fact of the 
international system poses a problem of internal coherence for the theory: indeed, 
it seems to contradict the liberal ideas of reasonable pluralism and equality that 
Rawls considers fundamental for his project of global order. Recognizing the 
                                                          
50 For instance, the Serbian government leaded by Slobodan Milosevic, the Iraqi government 
under Saddam Hussein or the Cuban ‘revolutionary’ government preferred to face long-lasting 
embargos and a hostile international community rather than to accept interference by 
democratic states (or democracy-supporting international organizations) in their internal 
affairs. 
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moral superiority of the democratic model over any other – decent or indecent – 
seems to contradict the idea of equality among the actors within the system, and 
risks leading to a paternalistic leadership of the Society by liberal peoples. 
Notwithstanding the imperfections of actual democracies, they could take it upon 
themselves the right to use coercive means to guarantee order within the 
international system. Indeed, Rawls seems to concede that war cannot disappear 
completely from the system – at least in the mid- and long-term, although the 
authority of resorting to war should be delegated to the Society as a whole. 
Moreover, war should be permitted only in exceptional cases – individual and 
collective self-defence, protection of (basic) human rights just in case of “gross 
violations”. Thus, the foundation of the philosophical project on the moral 
superiority of democracies could unexpectedly make the system less stable, 
because it can legitimize paternalistic or fanatic behaviours from the strongest 
democracies, and this would make every clash of interests much more risky, 
particularly if we accept the idea that when such conflicts involve actors with 
different cultural and political background, distrust and misperceptions can 
precipitate the events and lead to hard confrontations, thus increasing the risk of 
war.  
Although these limitations to the use of war and an increased cooperation 
among liberal and decent peoples are normatively desirable, it seems that the 
international society proposed by Rawls in The Law of Peoples would not be 
substantially different from the world we know. Within the larger picture of the 
international system, the troubling problems of power asymmetry which 
undermine the principle of equality, political injustices, systemic instability and 
latent possibility of war would not be solved with the adoption of a Kantian-
Rawlsian foedus pacificum. This league or federation would include only well-
ordered societies – at least until history refutes the democratic peace law of 
international relations – and it might intensify, rather than soften, the tensions 
between liberal and non-liberal peoples.  
To conclude, along these lines, such a scenario engenders many doubts about 
the scope and the desirability of a liberal Society of Peoples. On the one hand, if 
we look at it as a project of perpetual peace, Rawls’s proposal appears to be too 
limited in scope: it attempts at justifying the actual condition of inequality and 
injustice, rather than challenging the foundations of the status quo, and he 
proposes to start with the fact of democratic peace in order to enlarge the peaceful 
community including also decent peoples. On the other hand, if we consider it to 
be a proposal for extending justice as fairness, it does not seem to be more 
successful, because the possibility of actively pursuing the spreading of democracy 
and the guarantee of human rights or of distributive justice is sacrificed in order 
to enlarge the Society of Peoples thanks to the inclusion of decent peoples.  
 
 
